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This paper estimates a series of Taylor rules in order to assess the relative activism of 
these three central banks. Since Taylor rules typically involve a lagged dependent variable, 
whose presence has been identified as the result of interest rate smoothing on the part of 
the central bank, the paper first investigates smoothing in terms of the pattern of interest 
rate changes. It then estimates a series of standard Taylor-type policy rules for each bank, 
using quarterly and monthly data, with ‘backward’ and ‘forward’-looking arguments, and 
with and without lagged dependent variables. It also examines the effect of introducing an 
auto-correlated error term. There is some evidence that the FRB is more activist, but it 
also seems to be more smooth; the ECB seems to adjust faster but less strongly in the 
long run; and the BoE’s behaviour is more difficult to identify. However, the regression 
results are not always plausible or robust, while these policy rules are out of kilter with 
central banks’ own descriptions of what they do and the long lags involved raise questions 
about the relevance of the Taylor principle as conventionally applied. It is therefore 
suggested that researchers should pay more attention to the institutional context of central 
banks’ behaviour, in order to produce better estimates of their policy rules which would in 
turn shed more light on the issues of activism and smoothing. 
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This paper investigates the interest-setting behaviour of three central banks, the 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Bank of England (BoE) and the European Central 
Bank (ECB), with a view to identifying differences between them. It is well known 
that there are some important differences between the three central banks in 
independence, accountability and transparency (e.g. Favero, Freixas, Persson and 
Wyplosz, 2000). It is also clear that there are major differences in the size and 
openness of the currency areas as between the BoE, on the one hand, and the ECB and 
the FRB on the other. Here, however, the focus is on the way they set interest rates 
and, in particular, the relative ‘activism’ of the three banks. One reason for trying to 
identify differences in interest-setting behaviour is that evaluations of the relative 
success of the three central banks in meeting their targets need to be undertaken 
against the background of their interest-setting behaviour and may have implications 
for possible changes in that behaviour, as well as in the broader institutional 
arrangements. One reason for the focus on relative activism is that if the ECB could 
be shown to be systematically less activist than the other central banks, this might 
explain some of the poor macroeconomic performance of the Eurozone since 1999; if 
not, it would strengthen the presumption that the main factors responsible for the 
latter are structural ones, including the alleged lack of structural reform.  
 
Activism can be understood as the extent to which monetary policy reacts to changes 
in the economic environment rather than maintaining a constant growth rate of the 
money supply as recommended by Friedman (1959/60) (von zur Muehlen, 2001; 
Trichet, 2005). In a world where the behaviour of the monetary authorities is 
commonly captured by estimating Taylor-type monetary policy rules, the natural way   2
to measure activism is in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients in the estimated 
policy rule on inflation and, to perhaps a lesser extent, output. The core of the paper is 
therefore the presentation of a series of standard policy rule estimations for each of 
the three central banks. However, since these estimations typically include a lagged 
dependent variable, it is necessary to take account of the ongoing debate over whether 
central banks really smooth interest rates and over the correct interpretation of the 
presence of a significant lagged dependent variable in an estimated policy rule.  
 
The next section selectively reviews the recent literature on estimating policy rules 
and on interest rate smoothing. Section 2 examines the behaviour of the three central 
banks in terms of the earlier literature on smoothing which focused on patterns of 
interest rate change, notably the ratio of continuations (interest rate changes in the 
same direction as the previous change) to reversals (changes of direction), and notes 
measures of the variability of the policymakers’ instrument and the economic 
environment facing them. Section 3 presents estimates of ‘backward-looking’ policy 
rules for the three central banks, with and without lagged dependent variables. Section 
4 presents corresponding forward-looking estimates. Section 5 examines the effect of 
introducing in the policy rules a term to allow for serially correlated shocks. Section 6 
brings these various findings together in an attempt at an overall assessment. Section 
7 considers what conclusions if any can be drawn. 
 
1  Taylor rules and interest rate smoothing 
The concept of interest rate smoothing, understood as a tendency for the monetary 
authorities to adjust interest rates in sequences of small steps in the same direction and 
with few reversals, goes back at least to Goodfriend (1987, 1991). Detailed data on   3
the US was first presented by Rudebusch (1995), and comparable data for other 
countries have been presented by, for example, Goodhart (1997, 1999), Lowe and 
Ellis (1997) and Cobham (2003). In this literature smoothing is identified primarily in 
terms of a ‘high’ ratio of continuations to reversals, but attention has also been paid to 
whether the duration (length of time since the previous change) is higher for reversals 
than for continuations, and whether the average size of changes is the same for 
reversals and continuations and for increases and decreases. 
 
This literature typically argued that major central banks such as the FRB smoothed 
interest rates ‘excessively’, that is, optimal monetary policy would have involved 
more reversals with a lower ratio of continuations to reversals (e.g. Sack, 2000; 
Martin and Salmon, 1999). A number of possible explanations for such smoothing 
were put forward, the most prominent in academic circles being the argument that 
smoothing is an optimal response to (especially multiplicative) uncertainty (Sack, 
2000; Goodhart, 1999; Martin and Salmon, 1999), and the argument that the monetary 
authorities may choose to minimise reversals and adjust in predictable ways in order 
to maximise the pass-through from the policy rate to the long term interest rates which 
most affect aggregate demand (Woodford, 1999).
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The formulation of a monetary policy rule which sees the interest rate as responding 
to deviations of inflation from some target and deviations of output from the natural 
rate goes back to Taylor (1993). From the late 1990s there is a substantial literature of 
papers which estimate such policy rules for different countries and different periods, 
in order to characterise (and compare) the behaviour of the monetary authorities 
(notably Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998, 2000; Angeloni and Dedola, 1999; Nelson,   4
2000; Adam, Cobham and Girardin, 2005, Hayo and Hofmann, 2005). A major 
emphasis in these papers has been placed on whether the inflation coefficient is 
greater than unity, which implies that real interest rates rise in response to positive 
inflation shocks (Taylor, 1999; Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999). One common feature 
of much of this work is that a lagged dependent variable is included in the estimated 
policy rule, and this is rationalised by assuming that the interest rate adjusts gradually 
towards the desired or target level. Thus the presence of a significant lagged 
dependent variable in an estimated policy rule has come to be identified as evidence 
of interest rate smoothing. 
 
However, that identification has been disputed by Rudebusch (2002, 2005), who 
argues that while there may be some short term, intra-quarter, smoothing in the sense 
of deliberate partial adjustment, there is no partial adjustment at the quarterly 
frequency. He focuses on estimates of Taylor rules which use quarterly data, such as 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000). However, many of the estimates in the literature, 
including Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2005) and 
Hayo and Hofmann (2005), use monthly data. Rudebusch cites Mankiw and Miron 
(1986) and his own earlier work (Rudebusch, 1995) and provides a range of new 
evidence, to the effect that the term structure does not contain information about 
future interest rate changes beyond a couple of months, which it would do if the 
monetary authorities were operating systematic partial adjustment. Instead he 
proposes that interest rates appear to be smooth on an inter-quarter basis because the 
authorities are responding to serially correlated shocks, and offers (in his 2005 paper) 
a brief narrative account of those shocks for the US since 1988. For the UK Cobham 
(2003) has used the minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to argue   5
against the existence of deliberate partial adjustment, and to provide a narrative of 
interest rate changes which also emphasises serially correlated shocks. English, 
Nelson and Sack (2003) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004) have examined econometrically 
the Rudebusch emphasis on serially correlated shocks versus partial adjustment of 
interest rates, for the US, and have found that both exist but the latter seems to be 
more important, though Rudebusch (2005) is able to claim that these estimates are not 
very precise and they test only a simple AR(1) version of the serial correlation 
hypothesis. 
 
Interest rate smoothing, particularly on an inter-quarter basis, is at first sight the 
opposite of monetary policy activism: the smoother the adjustment of interest rates the 
less the monetary authority must be reacting to shocks. However, for countries like 
the UK, where the patterns of interest rate changes were very different in the 1990s 
from what they had been in the 1970s and 1980s (Cobham, 2003), the increased 
‘smoothness’ is clearly associated with a major improvement in the conduct of 
monetary policy and in its success in meeting targets for price stability, which would 
suggest greater, or at least better, activism.  Moreover, the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable in a policy rule makes it possible to distinguish between short run 
and long run responses, so that activism needs to be understood in terms of two 
dimensions: first, the speed of response and second, the magnitude of the full long-run 
response. In principle one central bank could have a larger short run (say, two quarters 
or six months) response than another but a smaller long run response. At the same 
time, following Rudebusch, it is important to distinguish between short run and longer 
run partial adjustment. 
   6
Sections 3-5 of the paper therefore present a range of policy rule estimates, on both 
quarterly and monthly data; with and without lagged dependent variables; both 
‘backward-looking’ and ‘forward-looking’; with and without a serially correlated 
error term. The rules are estimated on a common basis for each of the three central 
banks (though using mainly national rather than international data sources). The aim 
is to identify differences from common regressions, rather than to search for the ‘true’ 
policy rule for each central bank. In section 6, however, the differing policy rules 
discovered for each bank by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000), Adam, Cobham 
and Girardin (2005) and Hayo and Hofmann (2005) are also considered. First, 
however, the patterns of interest rate changes are examined. 
 
2  Patterns of interest rate changes 
Figure 1 shows the policy interest rates for the three central banks from the inception 
of the ECB in January 1999 to the end of June 2006. Table 1 reports the patterns of 
interest rate changes in line with the earlier literature on smoothing. While for each of 
the three central banks there are far more continuations than reversals, and the 
duration of reversals is much longer than that of continuations, the patterns of the size 
of changes are less clear (the BoE has on average relatively similar changes of each 
type but the other two have larger differences), the most striking point is the sharp 
contrast in the ratio of continuations to reversals, where the FRB’s ratio is more than 
twice that of the other two. Table 1 is constructed in terms of individual interest rate 
changes, but an alternative view is offered in Table 2, which considers the (total) 
change in each quarter. It separates quarterly interest rate changes first by size and 
then in terms of continuations, reversals and no change. When the ratio of 
continuations to reversals is taken on this basis, all three have lower ratios and the   7
FRB becomes much closer to the ECB, whose ratio is in turn a little higher than that 
of the BoE. Thus the tables show that a lot of the FRB’s smoothing is intra-quarter 
rather than inter-quarter, which is at least partly in line with Rudebusch’s claim, and 
on the quarter basis the BoE and the ECB smooth interest rates only a little less than 
the FRB. 
 
A rather different perspective is provided by considering the extent to which differing 
environments faced by the three central banks might have led to differences in the 
patterns of interest rate changes in abstraction from any differences in underlying 
behaviour. Table 3 presents data first on the variability of nominal policy rates, 
inflation and the output gap. It shows that the nominal policy rates were much more 
variable in the US than in the eurozone, but this was also true of inflation and (only 
just) the output gap. As between the eurozone and the UK, the nominal policy rates 
were more variable in the eurozone, and inflation and the output gap were also more 
variable in the eurozone than in the UK. Overall, while it could be said that the FRB 
was the most activist of the three central banks, it was also the one facing the most 
unstable environment; the BoE was least activist but had the most stable 
environment;
2 and the ECB was in the middle. Table 3 also shows that the real policy 
rate (ex post) was more variable for the FRB than for the other two, while if policy 
and the environment are combined by taking crude ratios of the standard deviations, 
as in the lower part of Table 3, the BoE appears to be the most active with regard to 
inflation, and the FRB with regard to output, while the ECB is the least active on both 
counts. However, it would be unwise to make much of these differences.
3 
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3  ‘Current argument’ policy rules 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS estimations of the following policy rule, often 
referred to as ‘backward-looking’, without a lagged dependent variable, for each of 
the three central banks on quarterly data: 
t t t t y i ε γπ β α + + + =  
where the (end-of-quarter) interest rate it responds to the current quarter value of 
inflation πt and the  current quarter value of the output gap yt; and the following 
corresponding rule for monthly data: 
t t t t y i ε γπ β α + + + = − − 1 1  
where the (end of month) interest rate responds to last month’s inflation rate and last 
month’s output gap. The interest rates used are end-of-period policy rates;
4 the 
inflation measures are ‘local’, i.e. CPI for the US, RPIX for the UK
5 and HICP for the 
ECB; and the output gaps are derived from a linear and quadratic trend regression on 
GDP, with the monthly output gaps interpolated from the quarterly (following Adam, 
Cobham and Girardin, 2005).
6  
 
The first set of results covers the January 1999 to December 2005 period, which is the 
maximum period available for the ECB, for each central bank. The second set of 
results is for longer periods – from 1990 for the FRB and from the granting of 
‘independence’ in 1997 for the BoE.
7  
 
It should be noted first of all that in each case the monthly and quarterly results are 
reassuringly close, except that the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistics are typically lower 
for the monthly estimates. However, in all cases the D-Ws are low enough to indicate 
serial correlation, which implies misspecification of some kind. The best defined   9
reaction function in the basic period (1999-2005) is that for the FRB, where the 
coefficients on the output gap are highly significant and just above unity while those 
on inflation are significant at around 0.5. The BoE, on the other hand,  has the poorest 
reaction function for the basic period: the output gap coefficients are significant and 
positive but small, the inflation coefficients are negative, and these regressions have 
the lowest adjusted 
2 R s and D-Ws and the highest standard errors (SEs) of the 
regression relative to the standard deviation of the policy rate over the period. The 
ECB is somewhere in the middle: the output gap coefficients are positive and highly 
significant at around 0.6 but the inflation coefficients are lower and not significant, 
while the  
2 R s are close to those for the FRB.  
 
Over the longer periods in the second half of the table, the FRB’s reaction function 
has lower output gap and higher inflation coefficients but is otherwise not much 
different, but the BoE’s function makes more sense, with inflation coefficients greater 
than or close to +1 though not significant, though the 
2 R s for the BoE (and to a lesser 
extent for the FRB) are very low. The difference in the BoE results between the basic 
and the longer periods suggests that if a longer period were available for the ECB the 
results might also be rather different. On the other hand, it is notable that the 
2 R s are 
much lower and the SEs much higher, for both the FRB and the BoE, in the longer 
period. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of estimates which incorporate a lagged dependent 
variable, as in the following equations: 
quarterly:  t t t t t i y i ε λ γπ λ β λ α λ + + − + − + − = −1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 
monthly:  t t t t t i y i ε λ γπ λ β λ α λ + + − + − + − = −1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (   10
which can be thought of as derived from the following in, for example, the quarterly 
case: 






+ + − =
+ + =
−1 ˆ ) 1 (
ˆ
 
where  t i ˆ  is the desired or target rate and the actual policy rate  t i  adjusts gradually 
towards the target rate. 
 
As measured by the 
2 R s and the SEs these results are substantially better than those 
in Table 4, which is in line with conventional findings that the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable is justified (and the latter are all significant), but the DWs still 
indicate the presence of serial correlation. The monthly results are generally less close 
to the quarterly results than in the preceding table, while the λ ˆ s, the estimated 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable, in the monthly estimates are rather 
lower than those in the quarterly estimates. This is at least partly consistent with 
Rudebusch’s claim that smoothing operates at the intra-quarter rather than the inter-
quarter level. However, the λ ˆs are not entirely consistent with each other; the implied 
adjustment from the monthly estimates is systematically slower than that from the 
quarterly estimates, as shown in Table 6. In addition the λ ˆs are lowest for the ECB, 
and highest for the BoE. 
 
For the FRB on the basic period the γˆs (estimated long run inflation coefficients) are 
both significant, at 0.66 for the quarterly and 0.51 for the monthly estimates. For the 
BoE the γˆs are significantly negative at around -1.5, which is implausible. For the 
ECB the quarterly γˆ  is significant at 0.44, but the monthly one is insignificant at   11
0.21. Over the longer periods all four estimates given are unsatisfactory: the output 
gap coefficients are insignificant, the inflation coefficients are negative for the FRB 
and positive for the BoE but all insignificant, and the λ ˆs are close to, and in three 
cases insignificantly different from, 1. 
 
4  ‘Forward argument’ policy rules 
There are strong, obvious reasons – notably the lags in the transmission mechanism, 
on the one hand, and official descriptions of policy by the central banks themselves, 
on the other – for supposing that the monetary authorities react to forecasts rather than 
current or past values of inflation and the output gap. In addition, the empirical 
literature has found evidence in favour of forward-looking responses and, following  
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), this has become the norm. The standard form for 
these forward-looking regressions, as identified by Favero (2001), is as follows: 
monthly:  t t t t t i E Ey i ε λ π γ λ β λ α λ + + − + − + − = − + 1 12 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 
Table 8 presents the results of forward-looking regressions of this kind, except with a 
shorter time horizon – nine months/three quarters – which gives a better fit for each of 
the three central banks discussed here: 
quarterly:  t t t t t i E Ey i ε λ π γ λ β λ α λ + + − + − + − = − + 1 3 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 
monthly:  t t t t t i E Ey i ε λ π γ λ β λ α λ + + − + − + − = − + 1 9 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 
But first, for completeness, Table 7 presents the results of comparable forward-
looking regressions without a lagged dependent variable: 
quarterly:  t t t t E Ey i ε π γ β α + + + = +3  
monthly:  t t t t E Ey i ε π γ β α + + + = +9  
   12
The estimates are GMM estimates generated through TSP in GiveWin. The 
instruments for the quarterly regressions are one to two lags of each of the US output 
gap, eurozone output gap, US inflation, eurozone inflation, US policy rate and 
eurozone 3-month interbank rate; plus for each currency area the four quarter change 
in non-oil commodity prices, in the oil price and in the real effective exchange rate; 
plus, for the UK, one to two lags of the UK policy rate, UK inflation and the UK 
output gap. The instruments for the monthly regressions are one to four lags of each 
of the US output gap, eurozone output gap, US inflation, eurozone inflation, US 
policy rate and eurozone 3-month interbank rate; plus for each currency area the 12-
month change in non-oil commodity prices, in the oil price and in the real effective 
exchange rate; plus, for the UK, one to four lags of the UK policy rate, UK inflation 
and the UK output gap. The eurozone interbank rate is used instead of the policy rate 
to allow the inclusion of earlier data. Because eurozone data is included in the 
instruments, and some of this is not available for many years before 1999, however, 
the longer periods in these tables for the US are much shorter than in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
In Table 7, while all the equations have positive, and most significant, β ˆ s (estimated 
output gap coefficients), seven out of the ten have negative γˆs (estimated inflation 
coefficients), and all have high SEs and low D-Ws. The only conclusion to be drawn 
is that these equations are strongly misspecified. 
 
The results in Table 8 are of more interest. The SEs are lower, the β ˆ s (estimated long 
run output gap coefficients) are mostly significantly positive and most of the γˆ s 
(estimated long run inflation coefficients) are positive. For the basic period, the FRB 
reaction functions have large (>> 1) but not significant γˆs. For the BoE the γˆ in the   13
quarterly case is near zero, but that in the monthly case is 0.88 (though not 
significant). The ECB also has γˆs which are < 1 but they are significant (at the 5% 
level). The λ ˆ s, which are again larger for the monthly than for the quarterly 
regressions, are all higher than those in Table 5 (the comparable backward-looking 
regressions), with the highest here being those for the FRB but the lowest again those 
for the ECB.  
 
For the longer period for the FRB, which as already noted is not that much longer 
here, the λ ˆs are 1.00 and 1.04 and the γˆs are either implausibly large and utterly 
insignificant (quarterly regression) or significantly negative (monthly). The BoE long 
period regressions have large positive, but not significant, γˆs, and very high λ ˆs.  
 
Table 9 shows the extent of implied adjustment on each of the regressions. The basic 
period FRB results imply that less than half of the adjustment is made within four 
quarters or 12 months, and the longer period BoE results have an even slower 
adjustment. Such lags in adjustment are clearly either implausible or indicative of 
much greater inefficiency on the part of the central banks than their success vis-à-vis 
price stability would suggest. The basic period results for the BoE and the ECB, on 
the other hand, suggest that 80-90% of the adjustment is made within the year, which 
is at least less implausible.  
 
5  Serially correlated shocks 
The final set of results to be presented involve the introduction of a serially correlated 
error AR(1) term, as in English, Nelson and Sack (2003) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004). 
This cannot be done through GMM, because the ‘black box’ of GMM allows for   14
serial correlation of the forecasts and it is therefore not possible to separate out a 
serially correlated shock term. Instead, TSLS estimates are presented, with and 
without the serial correlation term, for the following equations: 
quarterly:  t t t t t i E Ey i ε ϕ π θ η δ + + + + = − + 1 3  
quarterly:  t t t t t v i E Ey i + + + + = − + 1 3 ϕ π θ η δ  
monthly:  t t t t t i E Ey i ε φ π ϑ η δ + + + + = − + 1 9  
monthly:  t t t t t v i E Ey i + + + + = − + 1 9 φ π ϑ η δ  
where εt is i.i.d.,  t t t v v ε ρ + = −1  and the coefficients on the output gap and inflation 
are estimated in the direct, short run form.
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The top half of the table covers the quarterly, and the bottom half the monthly, 
regressions, for the basic period only. In each case the equation is estimated first 
without, and then with, the serial correlation parameter. For the FRB the ‘without’ 
equations are reasonably well defined, with long run inflation coefficients (obtained 
by dividing the θ ˆ s by (1- ϕ ˆ )) greater than 1 and significant. When the serial 
correlation term is included, the estimated output gap and inflation coefficients are not 
much changed. In the quarterly regression the ϕ ˆ  (estimated coefficient on the lagged 
policy rate) increases from 0.87 to 0.96, while the ρ ˆ  (estimated coefficient on the 
serial correlation term) is -0.30 but not significant; in the monthly case the ϕ ˆ  
increases slightly, and the ρ ˆ  is small and insignificant.  
 
For the BoE, on the other hand, the ‘without’ equations are much less plausible, with 
inflation coefficients which are small and insignificant. In the ‘with’ equations the 
inflation coefficient is unchanged in the monthly case, while the ϕ ˆ  is slightly reduced   15
and the ρ ˆ  is large, half as large as the ϕ ˆ , and significant. In the quarterly case the 
inflation coefficient becomes positive and significant (though the long run coefficient 
is still < 1), while the ϕ ˆ   falls from 0.69 to 0.51 and the ρ ˆ  is larger at 0.86 and 
significant. Thus in both cases the serial correlation parameter seems important, and 
in the quarterly case it seems to have a big effect in making the overall equation more 
plausible.  
 
For the ECB the ‘without’ equations are broadly plausible, with long run inflation 
coefficients which are positive and significant but < 1. The effect of including the 
AR(1) term in the monthly case is small: the other coefficients are more or less 
unchanged and the ρ ˆ  is small and insignificant. In the quarterly case, however, the θ ˆ 
is reduced from 0.49 to 0.14 (and becomes insignificant), the ϕ ˆ  falls from 0.41 to 
0.30 (and becomes insignificant) but the ρ ˆ  is 0.52 (though not significant).  
 
6 Assessment 
This section proceeds from a summary of the results of sections 2-5 to an overall 
evaluation of activism and smoothing at the three central banks. 
 
Section 2 showed that in terms of the pattern of interest rate changes the FRB 
smoothes heavily on an intra-quarter basis, and less on an inter-quarter basis, while 
the BoE and the ECB smooth much less than the FRB in the former case but only a 
little less in the latter. At the same time the environment facing the FRB was more 
variable, particularly in terms of inflation, than that facing the other two. Crude 
measures of the activism of policy relative to the variability of the environment   16
suggest the ECB was the least active of the three. However, too much emphasis 
should not be placed on such measures.  
  
Section 3 presented backward-looking policy rule regressions, on quarterly and 
monthly data, with and without a lagged dependent variable. The without equations 
were generally poor and clearly misspecified, particularly for the BoE on the basic 
period and the ECB. Those including a lagged dependent variable were better, but 
there was still evidence of misspecification in the D-Ws, while most of the inflation 
coefficients were insignificant and/or < 1. The λ ˆ s suggested consistently slower 
adjustment for the monthly than for the quarterly regressions, and were lowest for the 
ECB and highest for the BoE. 
 
Section 4 presented corresponding forward-looking policy rule regressions of a 
standard GMM kind. Again the equations without a lagged dependent variable were 
poor and clearly misspecified. Those with a lagged dependent variable were generally 
better, but there were no examples of long run inflation coefficients which were both 
significant and > 1. The implied speeds of adjustment were slower than those in the 
backward-looking regressions, slowest for the FRB and fastest for the ECB, and 
implausibly slow for the FRB (where the implied speed was zero) and the BoE in the 
longer periods. 
 
Section 5 showed the effect of including an AR(1) term as well as a lagged dependent 
variable in TSLS estimates of the policy rules. This made little difference for the 
FRB, but seemed to make a major difference for the BoE, where it made the quarterly   17
regression much more plausible, and some difference for the ECB quarterly 
regression. 
 
It is easier to obtain reasonable-looking policy rule estimates for the FRB than for the 
others, particularly the BoE. This may be due to the greater variability of both policy 
rates and inflation/output for the FRB. In general, however, the estimates reported are 
not impressive: there are too many negative and/or insignificant coefficients, there is 
frequent evidence of autocorrelation, and the speeds of adjustment are often 
implausibly slow.  
 
Overall, the FRB seems, from interest rate patterns and from the high lagged 
dependent variables (and unimportance of auto-correlation) in forward-looking 
regressions, to adjust interest rates more smoothly than the other two; but, on the basis 
of the size and significance of the long run inflation coefficient point estimates, it may 
also be more activist. The ECB consistently has the lowest coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable, which implies the highest speed of adjustment, but its long run 
inflation coefficients (from Table 8 and the Table 10 ‘without’ regression) are 
consistently positive and significant but less than unity; the importance of auto-
correlation is unclear. For the BoE, on the other hand, the results from the regressions 
reported here are very mixed, but the inclusion of a serial correlation term seems to 
produce more plausible results. 
 
One possible way to put some of these results together is to consider the time profile 
of the response to inflation and the output gap, that is the estimated extent of 
adjustment in each period multiplied by the long run estimated coefficient on inflation   18
or the output gap (these are point estimates, and not always significant). Figures 2-3 
give the response profiles from the quarterly without serial correlation estimates in 
Table 10 for the FRB and the ECB, and for the ‘with’ estimates for the BoE (the 
‘without’ estimates, which involve a negative inflation coefficient, are implausible).
9 
With regard to inflation the FRB has the strongest response at all time horizons, 
followed at some distance by the ECB, and with regard to the output gap the BoE has 
the strongest response, followed by the ECB, with the FRB’s response rising towards 
the ECB’s by the 12
th quarter. The corresponding profiles from the monthly estimates 
(not shown) are broadly comparable. 
 
These profiles derive from estimates designed to be comparable and generated from 
the same number of observations and with the same methods and instruments. 
However, it may well be that the three central banks make their forecasts in different 
ways so that their instruments should be allowed to differ. Table 11 brings together a 
selection of results from the wider literature of monthly regressions (in which authors 
have searched for the model which best fits each individual central bank): Clarida, 
Galí and Gertler (1998) for the FRB, 1982-93; Hayo and Hofmann (2005) for the 
ECB, 1999-2003; and Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2005) for the BoE, 1997-2003. 
Here, in contrast with the previous results, the BoE and the ECB as well as the FRB 
have long run inflation coefficients well above unity while, in line with the previous 
results, these two banks have rather faster adjustment than the FRB. The 
corresponding response profiles are presented in Figures 4-5. On this basis the BoE 
has much the strongest response to inflation, particularly after 2-3 months, while the 
ECB has a stronger response than the FRB, over at least the first 36 months. The BoE   19
also has the strongest response to the output gap, and the ECB’s response is much 
stronger than those of the FRB. 
 
In general the results reported here are not sufficiently clear-cut or convincing. Better 
– more robust, more satisfactorily specified and more precisely identified –  estimates 
of the policy rules are needed, particularly for the BoE and the ECB, before firm 
conclusions can be drawn about relative activism or smoothing. ‘Better’ estimates 
might come over time with longer sample periods, but the evidence indicates that the 
length of the samples may not  be the only problem.  
 
7 Conclusions 
This paper has examined direct evidence on interest rate smoothing from the patterns 
of interest rate changes in the three central banks, and then presented a range of 
estimates of policy rules in an attempt to identify differences in activism and 
smoothing. These investigations have thrown up some apparent differences between 
them – notably that the FRB has stronger long run responses to inflation, but adjusts 
its policy rate slowly, which at least in part works in the opposite direction; the ECB 
has smaller long run responses but faster adjustment; the BoE’s behaviour is more 
difficult to pin down, but when decent estimates are obtained they indicate both strong 
long run responses and adjustment which is faster than the FRB. However, at this 
stage it is not possible to offer a confident or convincing judgment about the relative 
activism of the three central banks. 
 
Two further issues should be noted. On the one hand, it is remarkable that the leads 
involved in these and more or less all other forward-looking estimates of policy rules   20
are much shorter than the lags which central banks themselves appear to believe exist 
– up to 12 months from an interest rate change to the effect on output, up to another 
12 months for the effect on inflation.
10  On the other hand, the implied speeds of 
adjustment in these rules are in many cases so slow as to cast doubt, not just on 
whether central banks really smooth to that extent (and why this is not observable in 
the term structure) but also on the relevance of the principle that the inflation response 
needs to be > 1 for stability. The Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) 
arguments for this principle were derived within an essentially static framework, but 
if the interest rate response to inflation does not reach 1 until 26 months after the 
shock (Figure 4, FRB) this leaves a lot of scope for adverse dynamics in the 
meantime. Indeed, it is difficult to make sense of the conventional static stability 
criterion when it seems that – even in what are widely agreed to be competent, anti-
inflationary central banks – the short run response is so small and it takes so long for 
the response to reach the level of unity. More importantly, it is clearly inconsistent 
with conventional perceptions of the way the FRB operates. 
 
Some contrasting insights can be drawn from two recent papers which put more 
emphasis on the institutional context of central banks’ interest-rate setting behaviour. 
First, Goodhart (2005), instead of using mechanically generated ‘forecasts’ produced 
within a TSLS or GMM model, reconstructs the ex ante forecasts which the BoE’s 
MPC had in front of it in each quarter (by using information from the BoE model to 
‘subtract’ the effect of the interest rate changes decided by the MPC). It is notable that 
when he estimates policy rules using these forecasts Goodhart finds much stronger 
relationships for the seven- and eight-quarter ahead forecasts than for shorter 
horizons, which is consistent with how the BoE claims to be operating. In addition, he   21
finds evidence that the MPC responded almost one-for-one, and without partial 
adjustment, to those forecasts.  
 
Secondly, in his study of interest rate setting by the ECB, Gerlach (2004) has found 
that (in ordered probit estimates of policy rules) interest rates respond more clearly to 
the ‘economic sentiment’ indicator developed by the European Commission – which 
seems to forecast the output gap three or four quarters ahead – than to direct measures 
of the output gap. On the other hand, the ECB does not appear from his analysis to 
respond strongly to measures of actual or expected inflation. Gerlach has also used the 
Editorials from the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin to construct indicators of “the Governing 
Council’s views of the ‘risks to price stability’ arising from recent developments in 
economic activity, realised inflation, and M3 growth” (p. 6), and he shows that 
interest rate decisions are better explained by these indicator variables than by 
objective macro variables. 
 
Taylor rules as conventionally estimated have undoubtedly been useful in identifying 
broad differences across countries and particularly across time in the behaviour of 
central banks, but for the questions posed in this paper they are insufficient. But the 
empirical results presented here, and the contrasting findings of Goodhart and 
Gerlach, suggest that efforts should be devoted to drawing more closely on 
institutional/narrative analyses of how these central banks are behaving in order to 
improve the econometric estimation of policy rules.    22
NOTES 
 
1  For more detailed reviews of the various explanations see Cobham (2003) and 
Rudebusch (2005). 
2 The BoE’s policy rates, nominal and real, were also on average much higher than 
those of the other two. 
3 See, for example, Trichet (2006). 
4 Much of the literature uses interbank interest rates, but these may be affected by 
other factors, notably foreign interest rates and capital flows. Adam, Cobham and 
Girardin (2005) showed that for the UK the results for the actual policy rate were very 
close to those for interbank rates. Experimentation with interbank rates for the US and 
the eurozone showed that was true there also. 
5 The BoE’s inflation target was formulated in terms of the RPIX measure from 1993 
to the end of 2003, when it switched to the new CPI (HICP) measure. Experiments 
with the data here suggested that it was not necessary to take explicit account of the 
change for present purposes.  
6  Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2005) found that industrial production, which is 
available monthly, is a poor proxy for GDP in the UK. See the Data Appendix for 
definitions and sources of data. 
7 Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2005) show that there is a structural break in June 
1997 for the BoE’s policy rule. 
8 The instruments are the same as in the GMM estimation for Table 8. 
9 These are point estimates, and not all of them are significant. 
10 Estimates of policy rules comparable to those in Tables 8 and 10 but with leads of 
7-8 quarters or 21-24 months on inflation typically produce significantly negative 
coefficients on inflation for the FRB, and insignificant and often negative inflation   23
 
coefficients (and large and highly significant coefficients on the lagged dependent 
variable) for the ECB and the BOE.    24
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FRB: federal funds target rate; FRB website. 
BoE: repo rate; BoE website 
ECB: main refinancing operations rate; ECB website. [Note: Eurozone 3-month 
interbank rate, source International Financial Statistics (IMF), is used as 
instrument in place of Eurozone policy rate, to allow longer period of estimation.] 
 
Inflation: 
US: consumer price index, percentage change since four quarters/12 months before; 
International Financial Statistics. 
UK: RPIX, percentage change since four quarters/12 months before; Office of 
National Statistics. 
Eurozone: HICP, percentage change since four quarters/12 months before; Eurostat. 
 
Output gaps: 
US: real GDP, chained dollars, seasonally adjusted; US department of Commerce 
website. 
Eurozone: real GDP, chain linked, seasonally adjusted, from ECB website, plus 
early 1990s data from Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2001). 
UK: real GDP, chained volume measure, seasonally adjusted; ONS website. 
Gaps estimated by linear and quadratic trend, monthly interpolated from quarterly. 
 
Non-oil commodity prices: percentage change since four quarters/12 months before, 
converted into local currency; International Financial Statistics. 
Oil prices: percentage change since four quarters/12 months before, converted into 
local currency; International Financial Statistics. 
Real effective exchange rate: percentage change since four quarters/12 months 
before, converted into local currency; International Financial Statistics.   28 
 
Table 1:  Policy rate changes, January 1999-June 2006 
 


























--   
FRB 90  36 21 1 2 12 54.4 35.2162.0211.0 53.3 0.32 0.26 0.5 0.25 0.42 11
BoE 90  23 7 2 2 12 74.6 43.6256.5 74.5 62.4 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.29 4.75




Table 2: Policy rate changes by quarter, January 1999-June 2006 
(%) No  change 
and 0.25 
0.5  0.75  1+  Continuations   No change  Reversals  C/R 
FRB  50.0  36.7 3.3  10.0 56.7  33.3  10.0  5.7 
BoE  76.7 16.7  6.7  -  40.0  46.7 13.3  3.0 
ECB  73.3 23.3  3.3  -  40.0  50.0 10.0  4.0 
   29 
Table 3: Variability of the policy rate and of the environment, 1999-2005 
 Policy 
rate 





   
  mean  s.d. max  min mean s.d. max  min s.d. mean  s.d. max  min 
FRB 3.25  1.94 6.5  1.0  2.62  0.74 3.83 1.25 1.54 0.63 1.66 3.17 -1.62 
BoE  4.71  0.77 6  3.5  2.30  0.27 2.90 1.90 1.00 2.42 0.94 3.90 0.70 
ECB 2.92  0.93 4.75 2.0  2.04  0.44 2.87 0.83 1.53 0.88 0.96 2.72 -0.33 
  Ratios of standard deviations 
  σi/σπ  σi/σy 
FRB 2.61  1.26 
BoE 2.91  0.77 
ECB 2.11  0.61 
Notes: quarterly data, 1999Q1 to 2005Q4; real policy rates are ex post, equal to the nominal rates minus inflation. 
   30 
Table 4:  Monetary rules, quarterly and monthly, ‘current’ arguments, no lagged dependent variable 
estimation: OLS  FRB  FRB  BoE  BoE  ECB  ECB 
basic  period  99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 




































2 R   0.91 0.92 0.47 0.46 0.88 0.89 
DW  1.00 0.27 0.39 0.11 0.63 0.29 
SE  of  regression    0.59 0.53 0.57 0.59 0.33 0.32 
S.d.  of  policy  rate  1.97 1.91 0.79 0.80 0.95 0.93 
        
longer periods  90Q2-05Q4  90M6-05M12 97Q2-05Q4 97M6-05M12 
























2 R   0.42 0.41 0.22 0.26 
DW  0.11 0.04 0.18 0.07 
SE of regression  1.41  1.40  1.05  1.02 
S.d. of policy rate  1.86  1.82  1.19  1.18 
Note: t-statistics in brackets, here and in tables 5 and 10, calculated from Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors   31 
Table 5:  Monetary rules, quarterly and monthly, ‘current’ arguments, with LDV 
estimation: OLS  FRB  FRB  BoE  BoE  ECB  ECB 
basic  period  99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q2-05Q4 99M2-05M12 
















































2 R   0.96 0.99 0.85 0.97 0.93 0.97 
DW  1.11 1.22 0.90 1.29 0.78 1.68 
SE  of  regression    0.42 0.21 0.30 0.14 0.26 0.16 
S.d.  of  policy  rate  1.97 1.91 0.79 0.80 0.97 0.94 
        
longer periods  90Q3-05Q4  90M7-05M12 97Q2-05Q4 97M6-05M12 
































2 R   0.93 0.99 0.88 0.98 
DW  0.71 1.36 0.82 1.01 
SE of regression   0.49  0.21  0.41  0.16 
S.d. of policy rate  1.80  1.80  1.19  1.18   32 
 
Table 6: Extent of implied adjustment over time from Table 5 
 FRB  FRB  BoE  BoE  ECB  ECB 
Basic period  99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 
2  quarters/6  months  0.74 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.86 0.77 
4  quarters/12  months  0.93 0.88 0.70 0.58 0.98 0.95 
      
Longer periods  90Q3-05Q4 90M7-05M12 97Q2-05Q4 97M6-05M12 
2  quarters/6  months  0.18 0.10 0.13 0.06 
4  quarters/12  months  0.32 0.20 0.25 0.11 
   33 
Table 7:  Monetary rules, quarterly and monthly, ‘forward’ arguments, no lagged dependent variable 
estimation: GMM  FRB  FRB  BoE  BoE  ECB  ECB 
basic  period  99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 




































2 R   0.92 0.92 0.60 0.60 0.89 0.85 
DW  1.23 0.20 0.34 0.08 0.74 0.24 
SE  of  regression    0.60 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.32 0.37 
S.d.  of  policy  rate  2.08 2.02 0.83 0.84 0.95 0.93 
        
longer periods  97Q1-05Q4  96M7-05M12 97Q2-05Q4 97M6-05M12 
























2 R   0.78 0.64 0.15 0.21 
DW  0.52 0.04 0.11 0.02 
SE of regression  0.99  1.20  1.14  1.10 
S.d. of policy rate  2.04  1.97  1.23  1.23 
Note: t-statistics in brackets, here and in Table 8, robust to autocorrelation.   34 
Table 8:  Monetary rules, quarterly and monthly, ‘forward’ arguments, with lagged dependent variable 
estimation: GMM  FRB  FRB  BoE  BoE  ECB  ECB 
basic  period  99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q2-05Q4 99M2-05M12 
















































2 R   0.98 0.99 0.84 0.97 0.95 0.97 
DW  2.41 2.05 0.57 1.11 1.47 2.14 
SE  of  regression    0.30 0.17 0.33 0.15 0.21 0.16 
S.d.  of  policy  rate  2.08 2.02 0.83 0.84 0.98 0.94 
        
longer periods  97Q1-05Q4  96M7-05M12 97Q2-05Q4 97M6-05M12 
































2 R   0.94 0.99 0.89 0.98 
DW  0.71 1.70 0.80 1.03 
SE of regression   0.54  0.17  0.41  0.16 
S.d. of policy rate  2.04  1.97  1.23  1.23   35 
Table 9: Extent of implied adjustment over time from Table 8 
 FRB  FRB  BoE  BoE  ECB  ECB 
Basic period  99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 99Q1-05Q4 99M1-05M12 
2  quarters/6  months  0.23 0.28 0.63 0.54 0.83 0.70 
4  quarters/12  months  0.41 0.49 0.86 0.78 0.97 0.91 
      
Longer periods  97Q1-05Q4 96M7-05M12 97Q2-05Q4 97M6-05M12 
2 quarters/6 months  -
1 -
1 0.15  0.17 
4 quarters/12 months  -
1 -
1 0.28  0.31 
Note 
1 Zero/not calculable - λ ˆ ≥ 1.00.   36 
Table 10: Monetary rules, quarterly and monthly, ‘forward’ arguments, lagged dependent variable, with and without serial correlation 
estimation: TSLS  FRB  FRB  BoE  BoE  ECB  ECB 
basic period  99Q1-05Q1  99Q1-05Q1  99Q1-05Q1 99Q1-05Q1 99Q2-05Q1 99Q3-05Q1 






















































2 R   0.98 0.98 0.85 0.92 0.95 0.95 
SE of regression   0.30 0.31 0.33 0.23 0.21 0.22 
S.d.  of  policy  rate  2.08 2.08 0.83 0.83 0.98 0.99 
basic  period  99M1-05M3  99M1-05M3 99M1-05M3 99M1-05M3 99M2-05M3 99M3-05M3 






















































2 R   0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
SE of regression   0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.16 
S.d.  of  policy  rate  2.02 2.02 0.84 0.84 0.94 0.94 
Note: inflation and output gap coefficient estimates are reported in direct/short run form.    37 
Table 11: ‘Best’ results from other studies, monthly, ‘forward’ arguments, with lagged dependent variable 
central bank  FRB  BoE  ECB 
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Figure 1: Policy rates, FRB, BoE and ECB, daily data 



























    Figure 3: response profiles, quarterly, output gap 
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